The 2nd Annual Symposium on Modern Warfare Agenda
“Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Modern Era of Warfare”

Friday October 6, 2017
International Cultural Center, Texas Tech University

8:00 AM: Opening Remarks
Dr. Ron Milam, Interim Executive Director, Institute for Peace and Conflict, Texas Tech University

8:30 AM: Session 1

Fifty Nifty Islamic States: An Analysis of Inter-Jihadist Relations

The importance of “Inter-Jihadist Relations” (IJR) will be shown by analyzing ISIS through its central, displaced, and competing terror networks; rather than simply defining ISIS as a whole cohesive unit to be fought and understood. As ISIS continually networks itself abroad, the inevitable mergers and acquisitions of jihadist groups can define the deeper psyche of the ISIS central command and its values. By identifying these things early on, we can modify our military operations to exploit this newfound knowledge with both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

There is a great deal of existing factionalization throughout the roughly 20 jihadist proclaimed states and provinces. Regardless of how “black and white” their announced values and ideologically representative flag are, a greyness has shown itself time and again as ISIS has evolved. I will open my presentation with a Data Section where I will define important aspects of the relationships in the original ISIS - Al Qaeda split, the ISIS - Boko Haram coup, the voluntary submission of Abu Sayyaf to ISIS, and other select examples in which ISIS has absorbed displaced factions.

I will make recommendations in two categories for stopping or steering the Inter-Jihadist Relations of ISIS with some reference to our modern understanding of how COIN operations function under FM 3-24. Those nodes in IJR of highest risk, or less options for manipulation, will be suggested to be eliminated by kinetic strikes. And those remaining nodes where there is high potential for malleability will have recommendations presented with case/area-specific details on how to influence them through psychological warfare, false flag operations, and/or other non-kinetic options.

I will also present my unique collective assessment of the current status of all global jihadism beyond the presented ISIS takeovers. This collective assessment on IJR is what I see to be a high potential for a communist-like domino-effect in IJR against westernized civilization, and therefore it should be taken more seriously and approached differently. Current US efforts on upholding physical security are justified, but the invisible attacks of a spreading ideological fad are much more present and capable at disrupting the western hegemony than just the occasional bombing of hard infrastructure. As the wisdom of strategic scholars like Mao and Clausewitz suggest, the best kind of victories are those won without firing a shot.
David Leroy Pointer III is a graduate student from Fort Worth, Texas. As an undergraduate he studied Arabic, Chinese, and Portuguese languages; and then entered his current graduate program in 2016. His area of study involves Counter-Terrorism, and is a result of a custom-developed Master’s Degree under the supervision of the Texas Tech Interdisciplinary Department.

His primary and highly valued research guide is Colonel Dave Lewis who is in charge of TTU’s national-security-oriented courses. David is also completing a supplementary Graduate Certificate of Strategic Studies, and his secondary research advisors are Texas Tech’s Laura Calkins and David White.

He has four certifications in educating foreign learners; is an active member in TTU’s Gamma Beta Phi academic honor society; and was elected to the Texas Tech Graduate School Commissioner’s Advisory Council where he is working toward establishing standardized BA, MA, and PhD degrees to be offered at this university for defense-related fields, as currently there are none.

After his thesis is fully completed in November of this year he hopes to work as a paramilitary operative under American supervision, continue his Counter-Terrorism studies at a PhD level, or teach English in Russia or China.

‘Hit ‘em in the Mind!’ Air Defense Missiles as an Insurgent Weapon

Airpower has been employed as a counterinsurgency instrument since before WWI, and for most of the 20th century insurgents were unable to mount an effective riposte. In many cases aircraft – the despised “metal birds in the sky,” according to rebels in Portuguese Africa – became the defining symbol of government might, representing the most feared and hated aspect of state power. Che Guevara, for example, ranked air defense as the second most important tactical task for guerrillas (following basic small arms use), while a half century earlier T.E. Lawrence bemoaned his Arab rebels’ “air impotence.”

The situation changed with the introduction of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) into guerrilla and terrorist arsenals beginning in 1973. Since then insurgent MANPADS use has led to the loss of hundreds of military and civilian aircraft, including helicopters, around the world. This paper will discuss the growing importance of airpower in counterinsurgency operations; the insurgent imperative to counter it; and the use of MANPADS as a guerrilla weapon. In particular, I propose to examine three case studies: the former Portuguese Guinea (today Guinea-Bissau), Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, and El Salvador. I will first summarize earlier MANPADS use in the Suez theater and Vietnam to provide additional context, and I propose to conclude with a summary of recent MANPADS use during ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia.

As a retired Air Force officer, a career intelligence analyst, and a military historian, I contend that these systems remain a potent insurgent weapon and pose a continuing threat to military and civil aircraft alike. Given the longstanding importance of airpower to counterinsurgency practitioners, no discussion of this category of conflict is complete without addressing the MANPADS challenge. Further, I have been studying guerrilla and terrorist MANPADS use for twenty-five years, in both professional and academic settings. This paper will correspondingly feature a wide range of official documents, including recently declassified sources, as well as first-person recollections to include mission debriefs and interview reports.

Presenter: David Pointer III
Dr. Matthew Hurley is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow with the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which is based in Arlington, Virginia. In addition, he serves as a guide at the National Museum of the US Air Force.

A retired US Air Force colonel and career intelligence officer, Dr. Hurley completed military assignments with Air Mobility Command, Pacific Air Forces, US Air Forces Europe, NATO, the Air Force District of Washington, US Forces Korea, Air University, and the Air Staff. His military service also included contingency duty in Southwest Asia, the former Yugoslavia, and the Horn of Africa. During his final assignment, he served as the Chief of Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Doctrine and Policy.

Dr. Hurley is a Distinguished Graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the US Air Force Academy. He received his doctorate in history from The Ohio State University in 2009, having previously earned a master’s degree at the University of Washington.

Dr. Hurley has published and presented numerous works regarding airpower history, operational design, and intelligence issues, and is currently writing a comprehensive history of Portugal’s colonial air campaign over Portuguese Guinea during the 1960s and 1970s.

In the ten years since President George W. Bush ordered a surge of forces to stop the cycle of violence in Iraq, two broad schools of interpretation have emerged regarding the deployment’s impact on the course of the Iraq War and its effect on the U.S. Army. For many analysts, such as Peter Mansoor, Thomas Ricks, Michael Gordon, and Bernard Trainor, the surge was the decisive turning point of the conflict. After years of struggling to settle on an effective strategy, the U.S. military’s decision to embrace the principles of counterinsurgency and protect the Iraqi people ultimately reduced violence and laid the groundwork for stability. Other scholars, notably Gian Gentile and Douglas Porch, have questioned the level to which the surge of forces and shift in strategies actually impacted the course of the war, noting that the U.S. had carried out counterinsurgency operations before 2007 and that the other factors, such as the ceasefire of the Shi’ite militia Jaysh al-Madi and the alignment of Sunni tribes against radical Islamist groups were more decisive.

Understanding the ultimate impact of the surge is critical to both comprehending the course of the Iraq War and preparing the U.S. military for future operations. For example, the Iraq surge’s apparent success was a major factor influencing President Barack Obama’s military advisors to propose a second surge for the war in Afghanistan. Over the past decade, both of America’s land forces, the Army and Marine Corps, have oscillated between preparing its forces for counterinsurgencies and training for conventional wars with peer and near peer opponents. The rise of ISIS has also highlighted the Iraq surge’s limited strategic gains, as the Iraqi government’s failure to capitalize on the stability brought about by the surge and lay the groundwork for true reconciliation among its sects alienated Sunnis and weakened the central government.

This presentation will examine the state of scholarship on the surge campaign and lay out new avenues of research and possible new interpretations. Among the questions it will examine are: was the surge the primary reason for the drop in violence that took place in 2007? What other factors might have contributed to the restoration of stability? Did the Army’s strategy in Iraq fundamentally change with the arrival of the surge brigades? Was the surge a strategic success, or were its achievements more limited? What role did the conflict between radical Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and Shi’ite militias such as Jaysh al-Mahdi play? Related to this, how did the tensions between the different Sunni and Shi’ite insurgent groups ultimately impact their own decision-making and objectives when it came to working with or against the U.S.-led coalition?

Presenter: Nicholas J. Schlosser, Ph.D.
Nicholas J. Schlosser is a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is currently working on an official history of the Iraqi Surge Campaign of 2007–2008. His most recent publication is The Surge, 2007-2008, part of the U.S. Army Campaigns in Iraq brochure series. Before coming to the center in 2014, he was a historian at the Marine Corps History Division, where he produced studies and research guides on Marine operations during the Iraq War. He received his doctorate from the University of Maryland in 2008. He is the author of Cold War on the Airwaves: The American Propaganda Campaign against East Germany, published by the University of Illinois Press in 2015, and the editor of The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, January 1964-March 1965. He has also published articles and reviews in The International Bibliography of Military History, German History, and H-Net.

10:00 AM: Break

10:30 AM: Session 2

Credibility and Reliability: The Building Blocks of Legitimacy

The topic of this presentation will examine the insurgency that developed within Iraq from 2005-2006 through a first-hand account. The delivery of the presentation will include pictures, video, factual evidence, theoretical perspectives on counterinsurgency operations, and my personal examples. I am currently a Sergeant Major serving at Fort Bliss, TX but 12 years ago I was a young Staff Sergeant placed on a newly formed Military Transition Team (MiTT). A MiTT is generally composed of 8-10 soldiers embedded into a battalion, brigade, or division sized element. The purpose and responsibilities of a MiTT were similar to the advisors used in Vietnam more than 40 years earlier in that we trained, coached, and mentored our Iraqi counterparts. Our mission was to embed into the 1st Brigade, 5th Iraqi Infantry Division located in the eastern portion of the Diyala Province where we conducted multiple counterinsurgency missions with the Iraqi soldiers each week ranging from reconnaissance and patrols to meetings with local sheiks. We operated throughout the province in cities like Khanaqin, Baqubah, Muqdadiyah, Balad Ruz, and Mandali to stabilize the area and promote the legitimacy of the newly formed government. Each soldier on a MiTT is assigned to a section in the Iraqi headquarters element of which I worked with Lieutenant Colonel Nabeel in the S-2 Intelligence section and Major Abbas in the S-6 Communications section. While on missions, I served as the machine gunner for our Humvee.

This presentation will provide details of how we attempted to build legitimacy into the Iraqi military and local elected leaders through reliability and credibility. We did this through countless hours training the Iraqi soldiers on house clearing procedures, convoy operations, and weapons qualification. This built warfighting competencies and confidence throughout the ranks. We also built legitimacy as we were very careful to ensure the Iraqi Army was leading the efforts in meetings with local village leaders, visiting schools and delivering supplies, and providing security during the first few pivotal elections. We supported their efforts both publicly and privately as we developed very close relationships with the Iraqi soldiers. We suffered hardships as well as celebrated victories together. The secular violence that began to tear through the country was kept to a minimum due to our combined presence.

Despite encountering enemy forces on numerous occasions, every member of our MiTT team returned alive and well resulting in each of us being awarded the Bronze Star and Combat Action Badge. Despite serving in various other positions throughout the Army, my time training and conducting counterinsurgency missions with
the Iraqi Army was one of the most rewarding times in my career. I hope to express how the principles we employed can, and do, create change in the local population’s hearts and minds making them less likely to support the enemy. Insurgencies are defeated when the people see legitimacy in their government and its security forces.

Presenter: Sergeant Major Michael Irvin (USA)

Impediments to a Successful Counterinsurgency Campaign in Northeastern Afghanistan

This paper presents the author’s personal experience in operations against one of the insurgent groups identified in the RAND study, the Hezb-i-islami group in the foothills of the Hindu Kush. In 2008 researchers at the RAND Corporation analyzed 90 insurgencies occurring from 1945 to the present and identified three critical factors on which success against an insurgency in Afghanistan hinges. These were: first, to develop “competent and legitimate Afghan security forces”, second, “improve the quality of local governance…especially in rural areas” and third, “eliminate the insurgents’ support base in Pakistan.” The RAND study also concluded that it “takes an average of 14 years to defeat insurgents”, and there is strong evidence that the United States would not be staying until the end.

This paper addresses one of the issues in implementing the second issue mentioned above, i.e. improving local governance, and describes the impediments to accomplishing the defeat of the insurgency, especially in the north-eastern parts of Afghanistan. Specifically, traversing the difficult terrain of Afghanistan, and accommodating the range of ethnic and tribal affiliations in that country’s large rural population contributes significantly to these challenges. This range of ethnic diversity, combined with the difficult terrain, caused the authors of the RAND study to concede that the results of their study of the Afghan insurgency cannot provide “a definitive assessment of what types of military and nonmilitary capabilities might be useful against insurgents operating in a non-homogeneous population”2. However, one of their conclusions, based on the recommendations of the The 9/11 Commission Report that the “outcome of the insurgency…is of such intrinsic importance to the United States…that failure to stabilize Afghanistan would decrease U.S. national security by allowing the country to become a safe haven for terrorists and criminals.”3, has been overcome by events in Libya, Iraq, Syria and to a lesser extent Pakistan and Iran. Therefore, while Afghanistan may not be as important to the national security of the United States as it once was, nevertheless, because of its geographic location and difficult terrain, Afghanistan should still be a priority for counterinsurgency operations, as it has historically served as a safe haven for illicit military as well as criminal activities.

Presenter: Sid Hamid, Ph.D.

Dr. Sid Hamid is a graduate student of history at George Mason University. He is well versed in the cultural and religious aspects of the Middle East, as his experience spans several decades serving in Special Operations units around the world, including the Middle East and the Balkans where these skills were essential for effective interaction with the local populace. Sid is a 30 year veteran of US Army Special Forces and is a veteran of both the Afghan and Iraqi wars. He has extensive experience in the National Defense and Homeland Security areas especially with regards to intelligence, terrorism analysis and counter/anti-terrorism, and has authored policies for the Department of Defense as well as published on infrastructure protection, personnel security and critical defense assets.
Despite vast research on Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, commonly known as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are sufficient gaps in our understanding of both regarding how well we did and how much progress the US military has made since 2001 in joint (more than a single service) warfighting. While there are many reasons for the enlightened critique, I argue that the primary reason for this healthy skepticism is because even though the operational names have changed, the wars continue. Great scholars and military leaders have even proclaimed that it appears as if we have entered a period of “perpetual war.” Whether political or historical, these discussions have a meaningful place in our public and academic dialogue. It is helpful to more fully understand how these wars began and how we (senior US military) thought about fighting back then and how differently we think about it today, even though the wars continue. There is no better analytical mission topic than Close Air Support to measure the joint nature of our warfighting, how one service can support another in direct combat action.

The forward air controller occupies a unique role in military warfighting. We have these type of controllers in all of our armed services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force), but the service with the preponderance of these controllers is the U.S. Air Force and they are now part of what we call Battlefield Airmen. In major combat operations, in current counter-insurgency operations and even in nation-building, the role of a well-trained forward air controller is often a key link in all of the operations that fall within the air/ground domain; they represent the human that has an air perspective from the cockpit of an aircraft, a weapon system (fires) command center, and the foxhole; they live and operate on the ground with maneuver forces and they call in air strikes primarily in the role of Close Air Support. In 2001, our major warfighting systems were focused largely on major regional conflict, large divisions of soldiers, and large wings of fighter and bomber aircraft. The Department of the Navy force-sized naval forces for global presence operations and the Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) was scalable up to major combat operations (but primarily focused on operations that were limited in duration and most likely in world-wide littoral regions). US Special Operations Command had a force structure that could also support the large war with direct action and reconnaissance, but also could conduct counter-terrorism (combat operations) and global counter-insurgency missions. Given all that, joint warfighting doctrine in general was still focused on the big war and we were not prepared as we could have been to fight the kind of fight that we did in Afghanistan. We did get better, however and this is that history.

How did we get better and how long did it take to make rapid battlefield changes to our doctrine, operations, training and command structures? I measure our joint progress in weeks not months, years or decades and I use the real war stories from the forward air controllers (now USAF Battlefield Airmen) who fought in both wars from 2001 to 2009. They are heroes and I love telling their stories. Even though my presentation will have implications for close air support, new digital technologies, drone warfare, cyber warfare, and counter-insurgencies, it will have a present-day concern for the large war fight as well. I will trace exact changes from Oct 2001 in OEF (Afghanistan) to July 2003 in OIF (Iraq) and then through Oct 2009, the month I retired as the commander of the forward air control wing of the USAF.

I name names and explain the good, bad and ugly of how we got better in the air/ground domain. I may not be able to predict how these wars will end, but I can definitely attest to how they began. Sometimes, when warriors tell their stories, they begin with “there I was.” Well, I was there and in command, but my presentation will begin, “the way we were,” and it will end with “what they did,” the forward air controllers, the Battlefield Airmen of the USAF.

Presenter: Brigadier General Michael Longoria (USAF, retired)
Mike Longoria or “LA” as his call sign goes was a career forward air controller in the USAF, he was also a combat control, now special tactics officer in AF special operations who spent his entire career leading Battlefield Airmen. He has over 500 combat flight hours, never as a pilot, but always as a close air support mission director in various USAF and US Army aircraft. He also has over 500 parachute jumps including a combat paradrop during the invasion into Panama with the 75th Ranger Regiment in Operation Just Cause. He commanded at all tactical levels in the USAF in combat (flight, squadron, group and wing). In his last combat assignment, he was the commanding general of an interagency, combined and joint task force to capture or kill high-value targets in Iraq, his 12th combat tour. He has been deployed to El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Columbia, Cuba (Guantanamo), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Bosnia, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Japan, China, Italy, Germany, Russia, Poland, Belgium, France, Spain, Jordan, Qatar, Somalia, Lebanon and the British Virgin Islands, (his personal preference). He was also on the staff of the National Security Council, White House, the Department of Defense, Headquarters, USAF, and served as the Special Assistant to the Commander, US Special Operations Command and as a special liaison for US Central Command to INTERPOL, Lyon France to place international warrants of arrest or “Red Notices” on the top terrorists world-wide. Most notably, he was directly involved in fighting for, fixing, building and then leading the men and women of the USAF close air support system in Afghanistan and Iraq during the time frame of Oct 2001 to Aug 2003 and then impacting air/ground development up and until his retirement in Oct 2009.

He is a native Texan and graduated from Mirabeau Bonaparte Lamar High School in Houston. Other schools in his resume include the US Air Force Academy, University of Northern Colorado, US Naval War College, USAF Air and Space, Air University, Harvard JF Kennedy School, but none as important as his public education in Texas.

1:00 PM: Session 3

Building a Strong Alliance with Local Armed Forces in Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned from Vietnam Veterans’ First-hand Accounts

T. E. Lawrence in his classic work Seven Pillars of Wisdom argues that “to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.” In fighting an insurgency, political and military tasks often intertwine, thus the American armed forces must enhance its flexibility and adaptability to the maximum in order to do the seemingly impossible job, “eating soup with a knife.” In this challenging process, American allies or local armed forces play a pivotal role in fostering a successful completion of the counterinsurgency missions. Examining the relationship between American soldiers and the South Vietnamese soldiers in the Vietnam War, this paper argues that building a strong and sustainable relationship with the local counterparts requires a deep understanding of the host nation’s ways of life in addition to the local ways of fighting. This understanding could not be achieved overnight; it was rather a long-term effort, a result of engaging with local soldiers in both combat and non-combat situations over a sustained period of time.

Presenter: Carie/ Uyen Nguyen, MA

Carie/ Uyen Nguyen [pronounced as “win-win”] is an international student from Saigon, Vietnam. She earned her Bachelor degree of International Relations from the Department of International Relations at Ho Chi Minh National University of Social Sciences and Humanities in 2008. Carie had more than five years of working experience for international corporations in Saigon, across different sectors such as advertising, marketing, market research, and public affairs.
In 2013, Carie moved to America to pursue higher education at Texas Tech University. In 2015, she earned a Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies, with an emphasis in International Affairs, together with a Graduate Certificate in Strategic Studies.

Currently, Carie is a third year Ph.D. student of the Department of History at Texas Tech University, studying U.S. Military History. She is working with Dr. Ron Milam on her dissertation about the Vietnam War regarding the American soldiers’ attitudes toward the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers.

The Problem of Local Knowledge in COIN: The American Defense Architecture and the Struggle with the ‘Human Terrain’ in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond

Much has been written about the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan with understanding the underlying social fabric, the ‘human terrain,’ as it was for a time called. Much of this writing is contentious, for efforts to integrate academic expertise into military operations proved controversial. This paper surveys the American defense establishment’s struggle with integrating academic expertise into the military framework, briefly surveying the Vietnam-era history with SORO, but emphasizing the Human Terrain System (HTS) and the post-Iraq and Afghanistan efforts to capture HTS capability without HTS. Highlighted are the ‘academic military divide,’—the cultural barriers between academia and the military—problems of classification and access, and suggestions for the future based on the author’s own field experience in HTS (2011-12) and his subsequent research into the institutional cultures that underlie the political-military framework within the United States.

Presenter: Brian R. Price, Ph.D.

Brian R. Price is Associate Professor of History at Hawaii Pacific University, where he teaches courses on American military history, strategy and counterinsurgency. He is also an ORISE scholar for the POW-MIA Accounting Agency, and is working on a book for Naval Institute Press, Eagles, Falcons & Warthogs: Gen. "Bill" Creech, Col. John Boyd, and the Struggle to Remake the Tactical Air Forces in the Wake of Vietnam. He has an article this month in Joint Force Quarterly. Previously he served in Afghanistan with 132 combat patrols, advising at the Brigade and Division levels; has owned a publishing house and served as a Vice President in Silicon Valley during the 1990s. He took his BA from UCLA in Political Science and his doctorate from the University of North Texas in History (2011). He also continues work in his second field, medieval military history, teaching reconstructed martial arts distilled from surviving manuscripts and has several books on medieval fighting, arms and armor. He may be reached at bprice@hpu.edu or scrimatore@gmail.com.

2:30 PM: Break

3:00 PM: Session 4

Five Guys Talk About Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

This panel, consisting of five seasoned combat veterans and tactics professors from the US Army Command and General Staff College, Army University, discuss the doctrinal underpinnings of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations and share some first-hand experiences. Historical trends suggest that COIN Lessons Learned are discarded periodically, thus requiring re-learning, re-capturing, and re-applying those lessons. These trends lead to educational and training shortfalls in COIN, Counter-Guerilla, and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). These trends demonstrate a lack of understanding of the COIN environment. How can this be done better? What are the essential skills and knowledge needed for future counterinsurgent operations? The panel will highlight Lessons Learned from a combat veteran’s perspective of counterinsurgency operations.
The discussion highlights security cooperation planning, specifically focused on foreign internal defense and security force assistance.

Presenters:
Chair, Lieutenant Colonel Michelle A. Miller, Ph.D. (USA, retired)

Michelle A. Miller, PhD., serves as an Associate Professor of Tactics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Army University and the combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) and combat veteran of the U.S. Army; she served 24 years on active duty as a Signal Officer in various positions around the world. Dr. Miller was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant from East Central University, Ada, Oklahoma, in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program. Dr. Miller’s areas of interest, study, and research involve tactics, academic advising, coaching and mentoring. In October, she will present findings at the National Academic Advising Association (NACADA) Annual Conference, in St. Louis, Missouri on advising active duty and veteran students.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. McConnell (USA, retired)

Richard A. McConnell, D.M. lives in Leavenworth Kansas and serves as an Associate Professor of Tactics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He retired from the military after 25 years and three combat deployments as an artillery officer. During his last combat tour, Dr. McConnell Served as a combat advisor to the 3rd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division of the Iraqi Army; serving alongside Iraqi Soldiers for 12 months. His areas of interest and research include examining how organizational leaders put people together with assets in order to accomplish goals. This area of interest is an ongoing endeavor in which Dr. McConnell received practical experience during his military service. That practical experience drove him to study leadership and management. Dr. McConnell completed his doctoral studies in 2016 and is continuing related studies. Most recently, he completed an examination of aspects of war-gaming with a research report in press for the conference proceedings for the Annual Conference for the Association for Business Simulation and Experiential Learning (ABSEL) in spring 2018. That report is entitled The Effect of Simple Role-Playing Games on the War-gaming Step of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP): A Mixed Methods Approach.

Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown, Jr. (USA, retired)

Ross A. Brown Jr. is a retired Army officer with over 20 years of service in the Field Artillery branch. He is currently an Assistant Professor at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where he teaches tactics to intermediate level education military officers. His Counter Insurgency and Stability Operations experience involves deployments to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope (Dec ’92-Mar ’93), Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (Feb ’03-Jan ’04) and Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (Apr ’08-Apr ’09). Commissioned in 1989 through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, he has held position of increasing responsibility in artillery units as firing Battery Executive Officer, Battery Commander and Battalion Executive Officer. His Fire Support Officer responsibilities to maneuver units were at Company, Battalion and Division level. These duties at times were complex in the application of both lethal and non-lethal resources to create effects in the operational environment. Mr. Brown holds a Bachelor’s of Science degree in Business Administration; Industrial Management from Rowan University, and an MBA in Business Administration; Computer Resource & Information Management from Webster University.

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan B. Rydalch (USA, retired)

Ryan Rydalch, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), is a Department of the Army Civilian Instructor currently working at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He serves in the Department of Army Tactics as an Instructor at the Command and General Staff Officers Course. Mr. Rydalch was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant from the Utah State University Reserve Officers Training Corps program in 1989, serving on active duty for over 26 years. He
served in numerous command and staff positions from the platoon to the Combined Joint Staff level. Some of his previous duty locations include; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Hood, Texas; Germany and Korea; as well as multiple deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr. Rydalch’s last deployment was in December 2013 where he served in Eastern Afghanistan, his 4th deployment in support of the Global War on Terrorism. He led the Brigade Security Force Assistant Team (SFAT) Office, which was comprised of 16 SFAT groups at multiple locations across six provinces. As part of this deployment, he authored and compiled assessments on the Afghanistan Security Forces and guided the Brigade’s primary advisory missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Tony Taylor (USA)

Lieutenant Colonel Tony Taylor was commissioned through the Army ROTC program in 1995, and assigned as an Army Aviator. He completed flight school as a UH-60A/L Blackhawk pilot and served in Germany from 1996 to 1999 with multiple tours in Bosnia and Albania supporting Operation Stabilization Force (SFOR). He served in Korea from 2000-2001 as the Brigade Training Officer, then returned to the US with the 101st Airborne Division serving 2002-2004 as a Company Commander. From 2007 to 2008 LTC Taylor served as an Iraqi Military Transition Team advisor to the 35th Armor Brigade in South East Baghdad. He helped train the Iraqi Brigade on Counter-insurgency as part of the “Surge” phase of the campaign and the introduction of the Sunni Awakening movement, known as the “Sons of Iraq”. He served as the Brigade Chief of Operations for the 3rd Brigade Combat team, 101st Airborne Division during the 2010-2011 deployment to Afghanistan. He led the Army ROTC program at West Virginia State University from 2011-2014 and served in Korea from 2014 to 2016 as the Eighth Army, G3 Aviation Deputy Director. He is currently assigned as a Tactics Instructor at the Command and General Staff College in Kansas.

4:30 PM: Closing Remarks

Dr. Steve Maxner, Director of the Vietnam Center and Archive and the Archive of Modern American Warfare, Texas Tech University

5:00 PM: End of Symposium